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9.7. Securing NFS

NFS is well-suited for sharing entire file systems with a large number of known hosts in a transparent manner. However, with ease-of-use comes a variety of potential security problems. Consider the following sections when exporting NFS file systems on a server or mounting them on a client. Doing so minimizes NFS security risks and better protects data on the server. server.

9.7.1. Host Access in NFSv2 or NFSv3

NFS controls who can mount an exported file system based on the host making the mount request, not the user that actually uses the file system. Hosts must be given explicit rights to mount the exported file system. Access control is not possible for users, other than through file and directory permissions. In other words, once a file system is exported via NFS, any user on any remote host connected to the NFS server can access the shared data. To limit the potential risks, administrators often allow read-only access or squash user permissions to a common user and group ID. Unfortunately, these solutions prevent the NFS share from being used in the way it was originally intended.
Additionally, if an attacker gains control of the DNS server used by the system exporting the NFS file system, the system associated with a particular hostname or fully qualified domain name can be pointed to an unauthorized machine. At this point, the unauthorized machine is the system permitted to mount the NFS share, since no username or password information is exchanged to provide additional security for the NFS mount.
Wildcards should be used sparingly when exporting directories via NFS, as it is possible for the scope of the wildcard to encompass more systems than intended.
You can also to restrict access to the rpcbind[1] service via TCP wrappers. Creating rules with iptables can also limit access to ports used by rpcbind, rpc.mountd, and rpc.nfsd.
For more information on securing NFS and rpcbind, refer to man iptables.